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Comparing the effect on private R&D investments of allowing firms to collude 
in R&D with that of providing R&D-subsidies (for which firms are taxed in the 
product market) reveals that in most cases, both under Cournot and Bertrand 
competition the latter policy is more effective than the former in promoting 
R&D activity. Analyzing the implementation of both policies simultaneously 
reveals that (i) allowing firms to collude in R&D is redundant and (ii) firms 
should only be encouraged to share their (independent) research outcomes (i.e. 
form RJVs) and this agreement should be subsidized accordingly. Abandoning 
antitrust legislation concerning private R&D is therefore not supported by the 
analysis presented here.
Keywords: R&D-subsidies, cooperation in R&D, spillovers.
JEL Classification: L43, 032.
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Policy makers face the problem of narrowing the fundamental gap between 
social and private incentives to invest in research and development (R&D).1 
One possibility to trigger private R&D activity is to provide direct R&D- 
subsidies, or to grant innovating firms tax credits. Another option is to allow 
firms to cooperate in R&D, a policy which recently has been implemented in 
Europe, the United States and Japan.2 Especially this latter policy has received 
substantial attention in recent economic literature.3
Cooperation among firms can range from occasional information sharing 
to maximizing joint profits. To avoid confusion as to what is meant by 
cooperation in R&D we adopt the definitions given by Kamien et al. (1992). 
They distinguish three types of R&D collusive agreements depending on the 
extent to which firms exchange innovative information and whether or not R&D 
investments are unilaterally or jointly set. First there are ’R&D-cartels’: 
"agreements to coordinate R&D activities so as to maximize the sum of overall 
profits" (p. 1294). This contract does not imply that participating firms share the 
outcomes of their R&D efforts, which means that technological spillovers (that 
is, the ability of rivals to benefit from each others’ R&D efforts at little or no 
cost) are not completely internalized. If on the other hand competitors agree to 
exchange only innovate information they participate in a research joint venture 
(RJV): "agreements in which firms decide unilaterally on their R&D investments 
but the results of their R&D are fully shared" (p.1294).4 Within RJVs techno­
' Katz and Ordover (1990) identify several forces which create the discrepancy between 
social and private incentives to conduct R&D. Depending on the industry, Bernstein and Nadri 
(1988) estimate the social rate of return to R&D capital to be 0.1 to 10 times the private rate 
of return (see also Mansfield et al.(1977)).
2 In Europe, the European Commission granted in its Regulation 418/85 a thirteen-year 
block exemption under Article 85 para.3 to collusion in R&D. In the United States some 
cooperation between innovating firms is allowed under the National Cooperative Research Act 
of 1984 and the National Cooperative Production Amendments of 1993. Japanese corporate 
law also allows firms to cooperate in R&D. For an elaborate comparison between Europe, the 
U.S. and Japan on this issue see Martin (1995).
3 See a.o. Jacquemin (1988), Marjit (1991), Suzumura (1992), Choi (1993), Geroski
(1993) , Kamien and Zang (1993), Martin (1994a), Simpson and Vonortas (1994), Vonortas
(1994) and Ziss (1994) and the other references in this paper.
4 Kamien et al. (1992) do not give precisely this definition of a RJV but it can be inferred 



























































































logical spillovers are completely internalized whereas in R&D-cartels there is 
still room for duplication of research. Note that RJVs do not entail cooperation 
in R&D to the extent that R&D investments are coordinated. Rather they 
indicate the sharing of results of independent R&D efforts. Finally, firms are 
engaged in a ‘RJV-cartel‘ if they agree to fully share the results of their R&D 
and to coordinate their R&D activities in order to maximize the sum of overall 
profits.5
On a firm level the benefits of sharing innovative information and/or 
colluding in R&D abound. Internalizing the negative externalities associated 
with R&D spillovers increases the appropriability of R&D investments. Further, 
synergetic effects may accelerate the speed of innovation (enabling colluding 
firms to start recovering their R&D investment at an earlier date) and widen the 
scope of research projects which are feasible and potentially profitable. This 
enlargement in range of potential R&D projects is particularly true if R&D is 
characterized by economies of scale or scope. Finally, forming RJV-cartels 
diminishes wasteful duplication in research, and risks and fixed (sunk) costs are 
shared (all leading to less overall spending to achieve a given innovation).
On the other hand there are also disadvantages attached to participating 
in a joint R&D project. Partner selection is difficult and the R&D venture can 
collapse if participating firms have different objectives. A single (big) R&D 
venture might be difficult to manage compared to several independent (and 
smaller) projects. Cooperative R&D may push participants’ ideas in the same 
direction (dead-end research), while independent R&D might yield a wider range 
of inventions. Members may be tempted to free-ride on each other, and 
successful joint innovations may disproportionately strengthen other members 
in the product market.
From society’s point of view there are also arguments in favour of 
allowing firms to cooperate in R&D and/or to share their R&D-results. 
Innovations are better disseminated due to the internalization of technological 
spillovers.6 This in turn leads to an increased rivalry concerning the use of the 
new technology (among members) and prevents monopolizing the rents of
5 In the sequel, whenever we mention cooperation or collusion in R&D we implicitly refer 
to R&D-cartels except when otherwise indicated.
6 Allowing firms to cooperate in R&D is clearly preferable to tightening intellectual 
property rights. The latter policy does increase the appropriability of R&D investments but 
diminishes the dissemination of technical know-how. Also the effectiveness of granting more 




























































































inventions. Also, if innovative information is fully shared new discoveries are 
more efficient because more firms benefit from a single invention. Further, since 
appropriability of R&D investments is improved and because the cost of R&D 
are lowered through cooperation (due to risk sharing and the sharing of sunk 
cost), private R&D investments will increase.
However, there are potential threats. Since successful R&D projects can 
lower margins in the product market, colluding firms may decide to do less 
R&D compared to independent research. This not only reduces competition in 
the R&D stage, but also in the product stage because fewer new products are 
introduced. In particular, a dominant firm may slow down the pace of innovation 
preserving its position in the product market. Also, since duplication of research 
might be avoided (depending on the type of cooperative R&D agreement) and 
because of synergetic effects, an agreement to collude in R&D may give 
members of the venture a disproportionate advantage compared to nonpartici­
pants. Increased entry barriers will then lead to socially undesirable market 
power for members of the venture. Probably the biggest danger is, however, that 
colluding firms are tempted to extend the R&D-collusion agreement to the 
product market to gain additional market power (for example, side-payments to 
preserve a production-cartel are more easily made).
On the whole, it is difficult to determine whether or not relaxing antitrust 
laws with respect to private R&D is socially desirable.7 Subsidizing R&D is the 
leading alternative to enhance private R&D investments.8 Of course, this policy 
also has its merits and costs. It restores (or at least stimulates) the incentives to 
conduct R&D. Entry barriers will be lowered due to lower (marginal and/or 
fixed) cost of R&D investments. This in turn will trigger competition both in the 
R&D stage and the product market (the latter because more new products are 
introduced). And, above all, the danger that firms will illegally extend 
cooperative R&D agreements is absent.
7 For instance, Katz and Ordover (1990) claim that "the United States has pursued 
mistaken and outdated antitrust policies that limit the ability of U.S. firms to compete in 
global high-technology markets", whereas Shapiro and Willig (1990) conclude that "there is 
precious little evidence that overly strict antitrust policies have stifled innovation by American 
firms or hindered American firms from competing abroad".





























































































On the other hand, R&D-subsidies do not stimulate dissemination of 
technological knowledge9 and firms may deceive the authorities to receive the 
subsidy (e.g. labelling to much personnel as researcher). Also, R&D-subsidies 
may even further distort market outcomes (possibly leading to socially excessive 
R&D-investments) and ex ante it is not certain that a government will only 
subsidize successful research projects.10 Finally, taxes to raise the R&D-subsidy 
have distortionary effects and may be politically unfeasible.
Although the literature on R&D-cooperation and subsidizing R&D is 
substantial, no analyses consider both policies simultaneously. This paper is an 
attempt to fill this gap and generalizes Hinloopen (1994). In order to keep 
results as tractable as possible we build on the stylized models of Dixit (1979) 
and d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988). The latter have developed a two-stage 
model, describing a duopoly for homogeneous products with explicit technologi­
cal spillovers, to analyze collusive R&D. In the first stage firms determine their 
R&D investment. Given this investment, output is set in the second stage (that 
is, firms act as Cournot competitors). Within this framework three different 
scenarios are considered, so that the effects of partial and full collusion on 
market behaviour can be examined: first, no cooperation in either the first or the 
second stage; second, cooperation in R&D and competition in output; third, 
cooperation in both the first and the second stage. To allow for products to be 
differentiated and to also consider Bertrand competition we combine d’Aspre­
mont and Jacquemin’s model with that of Dixit (1979). He provides us with a 
representative consumer’s utility function from which demand curves for 
differentiated products can be derived. Finally, to analyze the effects of 
authorities allowing firms to cooperate in R&D and/or providing R&D- 
subsidies, we also introduce an active government. Prior to the R&D-setting 
stage this government subsidizes R&D in order to maximize social welfare. 
Following Spencer and Brander (1983) we assume that firms pay a lump-sum 
tax in the production stage in order to finance the R&D-subsidy. With this 
framework we are able to compare the two policy options both under Cournot
9 Katz and Ordover (1990) conclude that therefore R&D-subsidies are ineffective in 
markets where technological spillovers are low. However, to the extent that R&D-subsidies 
increase private R&D investment (independent of the size of technological spillovers) this 
conclusion is premature.
10 If a government could tell in advance which project would be successful, many of the 
problems of R&D would go away. However, because a government does not have this 




























































































and Bertrand competition as well as to derive the optimal policy mix in terms 
of social welfare.
The main results of the analysis are that under both second stage Cournot 
and Bertrand competition: (i) a government can increase private R&D 
investments, output and social welfare, through R&D-subsidies, (ii) subsidizing 
non-collusive R&D optimally is more effective in raising R&D than permitting 
RJVs or R&D-cartels without subsidization (and in some cases also more 
effective than allowing for a non-subsidized RJV-cartel), (iii) subsidizing non- 
cooperative R&D or subsidizing R&D-cartels leads to the same market outcome 
(and social welfare)11, that is, cooperation in R&D is redundant, and (iv) yet 
only RJVs should be encouraged and subsidized.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In the next section the 
synthesis of Dixit’s (1979) model and that of d’Aspremont-Jacquemin (1988) is 
presented. Within this framework the three scenarios of d’Aspremont and 
Jacquemin are analyzed in Section 3. The subsequent section examines whether 
or not firms should be allowed to cooperate in R&D and/or to share their 
innovative information. Optimal R&D-subsidies for the three scenarios described 
above are derived in Section 5. In Section 6 the optimal ’policy mix’ in terms 
of social welfare is presented. Several concluding remarks are made in the last 
section.
2. THE MODEL
The supply side of the economy consists of a monopolistic sector, in which two 
firms each produce one variety of a differentiated commodity (qt and q2), and 
of a competitive sector which produces a numeraire good (q0). In the 
monopolistic sector the marginal cost of production, A, is constant, but can be 
lowered if firms invest in R&D (that is, R&D is process innovating). The costs 
of R&D are quadratic, reflecting the diminishing returns to R&D. On the 
demand side there is a continuum of consumers of the same type. Each 
consumer’s utility function is linear and separable in the numeraire good. This 
implies that the competitive sector imposes no income effects on the duopoly, 
allowing us to consider only a partial equilibrium analysis. The representative 
consumer maximizes (Dixit (1979))
11 In case of maximal spillovers this result reads as "subsidising RJVs or subsidising RJV- 






























































































U(q0,ql ,q2)~ '^P iqi = q0 + U{ql ,q1)-(<q0 + Y.piqi)
;.i
where q:, « = 1,2, is firm i's production, and p: the price it quotes. The 
parameter 0 e [ 0.1 ), indicates to what extend the two products are differenti­
ated; if 0~ 1 products are homogeneous whilst products are perfectly differenti­
ated (and independent) if 0=0. The functional form of utility proposed in (1) 
leads to the following system of inverse demands
p = a -b q  -Qbq2,
(2)
P2 = a -b q 2-Gbqr  
or, in direct rather than indirect form,
o t i  +t»; u  -o ;
For (3) to be well defined, products cannot be completely homogeneous. 
Whenever we refer to homogeneous products we implicitly assume that products 
are differentiated to an infinitesimal small extent, i.e. 0+e = l where e l o .12
Given demand and cost structures outlined above, profits of a single firm 
can be summarized by
where x. is firm i’s investment in R&D and where P € [ 0,1 ] measures the 
spillover effect. Following d’Aspremont and Jacquemin, henceforth DJ, we 
assume that a,b>0, q. + Qq<a/b and A>x + Px..
12 Strictly speaking we only have to make this refinement in case of Bertrand competition, 
































































































Welfare comparisons are based on the sum of producers’ and consumers’ 
surplus. In the context of differentiated products this measure deserves special 
attention.13 Spence (1976) shows that for the type of model considered here in 
symmetric equilibrium (i.e. xi=xj =x, and qt=q}=q) total surplus (T(n))  is 
given by
T(n)  = n(a - b( l+Q(n- l ) )
2 <?)<?.
where n is the number of firms. Social welfare for the model employed here 
thus equals14
W = T(2)-2(A-(1  +$)x)q-yx2
(5)
= 2 [ ( a - A ) + { \ + $ ) x - b{X^ ) q ] q - y x \
It is this expression we seek to maximize when providing R&D-subsidies for 
which firms are taxed in the output stage, supposing that firms’ outputs and 
R&D-investments are the equilibrium outcomes of the appropriate market game.
3. COOPERATIVE AND NON-COOPERATIVE R&D:
COURNOT AND BERTRAND
We proceed with solving the DJ games for the model presented in Section 2. 
Because products are allowed to be differentiated we will consider both Cournot 
and Bertrand competition.
3.1 NO COOPERATION IN EITHER R&D OR OUTPUT: COMPETITIVE R&D
Maximizing (4) with respect to q. for * = 1,2, conditional on R&D expenditures 
gives us the equilibrium quantity
1—— l(a - A)(2 -0)  + (2 - eP)x.+(2P -6)x  ], (6)
b (4 - 0  )
13 See Martin (1985) and the comment of Wildman (1984) on Scherer (1979).




























































































for i,j= 1,2, i#j.  If on the other hand in the second stage firms compete in 
prices, (4) must be maximized with respect to for i = 1,2. Equilibrium prices 
thus derived equal
p, = — L .  [(2 + 0 ) (A + ( l -0 ) a ) - ( 2 + 0 p ) x l-(2p+0)jc]> (7)
4 - 0 2
for i j  =1,2, i* j. In the preceding stage, when firms determine their R&D 
investment, profits in case of Cournot or Bertrand competition can be written 
respectively as
2
< (* ,,* .) =------L _ [ ( a - A ) ( 2 - 0 ) +( 2 - e p ) x .+( 2 p - e ) x ] 2-YfL, (8a)
' 1 b( 4 - 0 2)2 1 2
71? (X/,Xj) = d - 9 )
b (\  +0)(2-0)
x [ ( a - A ) -
(2 - 0P - 02)x  + (2P - 0 - 02p)x x,2
-------------------------------------- -] "Y—
(1 - 0)(2  + 0 )  2
(8b)
for i,j= 1,2, i* j. R&D-reaction functions follow from dnj(xi,x.)ldxi=0, for 
i,j  =1,2, /*/,  and are given by15
= 2 ( a - A ) ( 2 - 0 ) ( 2 - 0 P )  ̂ 2 ( 2 - 0 P ) ( 2 p - 0 )  v c
' J £>y(4-02)2 -2(2 -0P)2 fcy(4-02)2- 2 ( 2 - 0 p ) 2 '  ’
x b, b = 2 ( a - A ) ( l - 0 ) ( 2 + 0 ) ( 2 - 0 p - 0 2)
' 2 *7(1 -02)(4 - 02)2 -  2 ( 2 - 0 p - 0 2)2
A 2 ( 2 - 0 p - 0 2) ( 2 p - 0 - 0 2p) vB 
by( \ -02)(4 - 02)2 - 2 ( 2 - 0P~02)2 1 ’
for i j  = l ,2 ,  i* j. From these we can derive the following stability conditions 
(see e.g. Henriques (1990))
15 The second order condition for the Cournot case is that 2 (2 -0 P )2<i>Y(4-82)2, while 




























































































|3A:1c( ^ c) / a ^ c | < l » f o 7 ( 4 - e 2) (2 + 0 )> 2 (2 -e 3 ) ( l  +P), (9a)
|ax,s ( x / ) / 3 x / | < l « f o 7 ( l  + 0 ) (2 -0 ) (4 -0 2) > 2 ( 2 - 0 3 - e 2)(l  +3). (%)
Equating the R&D-reaction functions finally leads to equilibrium R&D 
investments
x c m 2( a - A ) ( 2 - 0 3 )
(>7(2 + 0 ) (4 - 0 2) -  2(2 - 0 3 K 1 +3) '
= __________ 2(n -A ) (2 - 0 3 - 02)_________
&7(1 + 0 ) (2 - 0 ) ( 4 -0 2) - 2 ( 2 - 0 p - 0 2)(l  +3) '
(10a)
(10b)
Notice that stability conditions (10) ensure that both in case of second stage 
Cournot and Bertrand competition R&D investments are positive.
3.2 COOPERATION IN R&D, COMPETITION IN OUTPUT: R&D-CARTEL
When firms cooperate in R&D but compete in the second stage, equilibrium 
quantities are still given by (6) if firms’ decision variable is output, while 
equilibrium prices equal (7) if firms play the Bertrand game. In the second stage 
firms maximize joint profits (i*j)
n c(x.,x.) =
n a (*,.,*;) =
----- L ^ E { [ ( « - A ) ( 2 - 0 ) +(2 - 0 3 )w + (2 3 - 0 )x ]2
£>(4-0 )2
( 1 - 0 )
£>(1 +0)(2-0)
x £{ [ (a -A )  +
(2 - 03 -  02) x +(23 - 0 - 023 )x. x?
---------------------------------------------i ]2 - 7 —
( 1 -0)(2 +0) 2




























































































stage) profits are given by16
2 ( a - A ) ( l+ p )  
fcy(2 + 9)2- 2 ( l  +P)2
and
x B = 2(a —A ) ( 1 — 9 ) ( 1 +p)




Comparing (11) with (10) reveals that allowing firms to cooperate in R&D 
increases R&D investment if P>9/2 for the Cournot game and if(3>9/(2 -92) 
when firms face Bertrand competition. Considering the Cournot case first, note 
that when products are homogeneous (i.e. 9 = 1) "for large spillovers, that is, 
(3>9.5, the level of R&D increases when firms cooperate in R&D" (DJ, 
p. 1135). However, neglecting the fact that products are differentiated imposes 
too strict a condition on the size of technological spillovers for cooperation to 
increase R&D investment, since for differentiated products 9/2 is below 0.5. If, 
for example, authorities have no or poor information on the extent to which 
products are differentiated and therefore assume 9 to be uniformly distributed 
over the unit interval, then it can be expected that also for values of (3 between 
0.25 and 0.5 cooperative R&D exceeds non-cooperative R&D, since the 
expected value of 9/2 equals 0.25. If also the spillover effect is unknown to the 
government and therefore it also assumes (3 to be uniformly distributed over the 
unit interval, cooperation will lead to an increase in R&D expenditure with a 
probability of 75% (as opposed to 50% for homogeneous goods).17 In the 
limiting case of completely differentiated products, cooperation in R&D always 
leads to more R&D investment.
If on the other hand firms are engaged in Bertrand competition, 
competitive R&D investment always exceeds cooperative R&D investment if 
products are (almost) homogeneous. That is, allowing firms to form an R&D- 
cartel leads to less overall R&D-investment. Restricting the analysis to Cournot 
competition, as is commonly done in the literature, can therefore lead to
16 The second order condition is 2(2 -9 P )2 + 2(2P -0 )2<i>y(4-92)2 under Coumot, and 
under Bertrand we impose that ( 2 - 0 P - 0 2)2+ (2P - 0 -02P)2< iy ( 1 — 02)(4 — 02)2/2 .




























































































misleading conclusions as to the effect on private R&D investment of allowing 
firms to cooperate in R&D. Again, however, it is more realistic to assume 
products to be differentiated. In that case allowing firms to cooperate in R&D 
can trigger R&D activity. For instance, if it is held that the government is poorly 
informed about the degree of product differentiation and it consequently assumes 
this degree to be uniformly distributed over [0,1], then the expected value of9/(2 -02) 
is In(2)/2-0.35. That is, cooperative R&D exceeds non-cooperative R&D 
whenever the spillover rate is above 35%. If the extent to which technological 
knowledge leaks out is also assumed to be uniformly distributed between 0 and 
1, the probability that allowing firms to cooperate in R&D will increase R&D 
investment is 65%.18 Finally, as in the case of second stage Cournot competi­
tion, cooperative R&D always exceeds competitive R&D when products are 
completely differentiated.
Before we proceed with analyzing the full cooperation case it is 
worthwhile to give some thoughts as to why cooperative R&D exceeds non- 
cooperative R&D only when spillovers are substantial (relative to the degree of 
product differentiation). A possible explanation lies in the interaction between 
synergy and technological spillovers. If spillovers are modest (i.e. (3<0/2 or 
P< 0/( 2 -02) , depending on the type of competition firms are engaged in), 
synergy from cooperation can be expected to be counterproductive. Cooperation 
in R&D will therefore induce firms to reduce R&D investment compared to 
competitive R&D efforts. On the other hand, if spillovers are substantial (i.e. 
P>0/2 or P>0/ (2-02)), synergetic effects will contribute positively to the 
R&D-process (and because the collusive R&D investment is increasing in the 
spillover rate, synergy outweighs the disincentives of non-appropriability19). 
Moreover, in this case the appropriability of independent research is much less 
compared to the small spillover case. As a result, competitive R&D falls below 
collusive R&D.
3.3 COOPERATION IN BOTH R&D AND OUTPUT: MONOPOLY
If firms are allowed to collude both in the first and second stage of the 
production process they first maximize joint profits
18 f X (2-e>)rfPrfe = 1 -ln(2)/2=0.65.
19 An appendix in which several partial derivatives are analyzed (including those 






























































































n  (?,,<?,,*,,*) = Z{p.qr ( A - x i- ( l +$)xJ)qr y ^ - } ,  i* j,
over their control variable. Symmetric optimal quantities, when quantity is also 
the control variable, conditional on x ( =x.=x.) are
( a -A )+ ( l+ p )x
<?,(*) i=l ,2 . (13)2 b ( l +0)
if firms set price in the second stage, then the symmetric equilibrium price
p. ( x )  = ( a ~A)  2(1 +^ )x., i = l , 2 .  (14)
Of course, in case of a monopoly the choice of decision variable in the second 
stage is not important since monopoly profits will always be the same. As a 
consequence, profit conditional on the R&D investment is the same, whether 
firms set price or quantity in the second stage, and is given by
n o o  = 1 . [ ( a - A M l + p u r - y * 2.
2 6 ( 1 + 6 )
Monopoly R&D investment maximizes this expression, and equals20 
( a -A ) ( l+ P )C B 
xm “ x/n
2by( 1 +0) -(1 +p)2
(15)
(16)
Having solved all three games we can compare R&D investments under 









> xl l . p P[o. 0(4+20+02) ),8 + 80 + 262 - 93
> xn >
0(4 + 2 0 +02) e }>
8 + 80 + 202 - 03 2
> X,C, P 6 ( | , l ] ,
(17)




























































































in case of Cournot competition. Similar results hold under Bertrand competition
b b b o m 9 ( 4 - 2 0 - 0 2). x, > xm > x„ , Pe  [ 0 ,_ i ---- — ),
8 -  202 +  03
b b b a , 0 ( 4 - 2 0 - 0 2) 0 .
Xm  >  X, >  x „  ,  0 6 (  '  ’ - T - Z Ï ) ’
8 -  202 +  03 2 -  02
B B B q / 0 ,x„i > X„ > X, , P e ( ----- - , l ] .
2 - 0 2
(IB)
Under both Cournot and Bertrand competition, cooperation in R&D and in either 
setting price or quantity leads in most cases to the highest level of R&D 
investment. DJ remark that "this stems from the fact that less competition in the 
product market allows the firms to capture more of the surplus created by their 
research and induce more R&D expenditures" (p. H35). Deciding whether or 
not firms should be allowed to fully cooperate should however be based on the 
implications this agreement has on social welfare. It is to the analysis of these 
implications that we now turn.
4. A CASE FOR COOPERATION IN R&D?
As can be concluded from Section 3, the effect on private R&D investment (and 
hence on all other variables) of allowing firms to cooperate in R&D (i.e. to form 
R&D-cartels), to fully exchange innovative information (i.e. to form RJVs), or 
to do both (i.e. to form RJV-cartels) depends on the degree of product 
differentiation, on the extent to which technological knowledge leaks out and on 
the type of competition firms face in the second stage of the production process. 
In this section firms’ (dis)incentives to cooperate in R&D and/or to fully 
exchange innovative information are contrasted with the effect these agreements 
have on social welfare. In order to do so we first have to solve the Cournot and 




























































































Table 1 Equilibrium Outcomes of the Non-Subsidized Cournot Games
No Cooperation in R&D, No Cooperation in Production
Pi * Q,c-
2(a-A)(2-eP) i>y(a-A )(4-02)( l +6) 2y(a -A )(4 -0 2)
fcy(2+0)(4-02)-2(2-0P)( l*P)  i>y(2 +0)(4-02) -2(2-0P)( l+P) by(2 +0)(4-02) -2(2 -0P)( 1 +P)
Kc .  y (a -A )2lf ty(4-62)2- 2 ( 2 - 8 P ) 2]
' [*y(4-e2)(2+e)-2C2-ep)(l +P)]2 W,
c _ y (a -A )2[fey(4-02)2(3 +8) -4 (2  -8  P)2] 
[fcy(2+9)(4-92) - 2 ( 2 - 9 P ) ( l  + P))2
Cooperation in R&D, No Cooperation in Production
, c _  2 (a -A ) (  1 + p) p c ,  „ . /> y (a -A ) (2 + 0 ) ( l+ 0 )  p  c .  2y(a-A )(2+8)
" i>y(2 +9)2 -2(  1 +P)2 " 6y(2 +0)2 -2 (  1 +P)2 " fcy(2+0)2- 2 ( l  +P)2
y (a -A )2
èy(2 +8)2-2 (  1 +P)2
W,
c _ y (a -A )2[fcy(3+0)(2+0)2- 4 ( l + P ) 2] 
[ iy (2  +8)2-2 (  1 +P)2]2
Cooperation in R&D, Cooperation in Production
t c .  (a -A)( 1 +P) 
26y( 1 +0) -(  1 +p)2
c _ ( a -A ) [ fc y ( l+ 9 ) - ( l+ P )2] _ c _  2y(a-A)
Pm ~ --- —————————:----- sdm -2by( 1 +8) -(  1 +P)2 2fcy(l + 8 ) - ( l  +P)2
y (a -A)2
2[2fcy( 1 +0) -( X +P)2]
, c  .  y (a -A )2[3 f ry ( l+ 8 ) - ( l+ P )2] 




























































































Table 2 Equilibrium Outcomes of the Non-Subsidized Bertrand Games1
No Cooperation in R&D 
No Cooperation in Production
Cooperation in R&D 
No Cooperation in Production
X B
2(a-A)(2- e p - 02) 2(a —A)( 1 —0)( 1 +P)
by( l+8)(2-0)(4-82)-2(l + P)(2 -0p-02) bY(1 +0)(2-0)2 - 2 (  1 +P)2(1 -0)
P B
ty(a-A)(4-92)(l +0) &Y(«-^)d +0)(2-0)
i>Y(l +0)(2-0)(4-82)-2( 1 *P)(2-0p-02) by( 1 +9)(2—0)2—2(1 +P)2(1 —0)
QB 2y(a  -A)(4-82) 2y(«-A)(2-0)
*Y(1 +0)(2-0)(4-e2) -2( 1 +p)(2-ep-02) by( 1 +0)(2 -0)2 -2(1 +P)2( 1 -0)
k b
y ( a - A Ÿ [ b y ( \  —02)(4 — 02)2 —2(2 —0 fi — 02 )2 J Y(n-A)2(l-0)
C*Y(1 +0)(2-0)(4-02)-2(l + P)(2-00-02)]2 b y ( l  +0)(2-0)2-2(l +P)2(1 -0)
Y(a-/t)2 y  (a - A)2
WB v [fcv(4 -02)2(3 - 20)( 1 +0) -4(2 - 03 -02)2] v [*Y(2-0)2O +9)(3-20)-4(l -8)2(1 + P)2]
[ 2>y( 1 +0)(2-0)(4-02)-2(l +p)(2-0p-02)]2 [byO  +0)(2- 0)2-2(1 + p)2(l -0)]2




























































































We begin with examining RJVs. Simulation results indicate the follow-
ing21
dW,c
> 0 , V0e[O,O.8O],
a w /
~ W
>0 , v e  e [0,0.44].
(19)
These partial derivatives show that if products are differentiated at least to a 
modest degree (0<O.8O in case of Cournot competition and 0<O.44 for 
Bertrand behaviour) RJVs are socially desirable. On the other hand, and 
especially in case of Bertrand competition, when products are homogeneous it 
could be socially harmful to allow firms to fully exchange innovative informa­
tion. Further observe that 3nf/3p>0 for 0e [O , l ]  and 37tf/3[J>0 for 
0 e  [0,0.47], i.e. firms are always willing to exchange innovative information 
voluntarily if they are engaged in Cournot competition, or if they face Bertrand 
competition and products are differentiated at least to a modest degree. Note 
however that in case of both Cournot and Bertrand competition firms are willing 
to fully share information when it is socially beneficial to allow them to do so 
(see (19)).
Second, we investigate R&D-cartels. From a social welfare point of view 
we have as ranking for Cournot competition21 2
21 Whenever possible analytical expressions are derived. However, sometimes these are 
too complicated to be interpreted. In these cases we rely on numerical approximations. The 
numbers given in the text always refer to the case in which the various second order and 
stability conditions are just met in order to highlight the role of 9 and P . In effect this means 
that we set by  equal to 3 in case of second stage Cournot competition while under Bertrand 
behaviour by  equals 2 (2 -0 P  — 02)2/ ( 1 — 02)(4 — 02)2. Indeed, if by  is arbitrarily large, the 
influence of either 9 or 3 becomes negligible. However, all numerical approximations stated 
in the paper are valid for (at least) bye [3,1 TO11] under Cournot and for bye[K,°°) under 
Bertrand, where k is the above mentioned value. Clearly this includes all interesting 
parameter configurations, i.e. the numerical values presented are generally valid. Finally 
observe that nowhere is the size of ( a - A)  of importance.




























































































V p G [ 0 , I ) .
V P e ( | , 8 ) , (20)
W„C > W,?, > W,c V p £(8,1 ].
where simulations indicate that 8 = 0. Similar results hold for the Bertrand
23case
These comparisons show that independent of the size of technological spillovers, 
of the extent to which products are differentiated and of the type of competition 
firms face in the second stage, social welfare of the second game always 
exceeds that of the third, i.e. it is always socially harmful if firms extend their 
R&D-collusive agreement to the production stage. Further, allowing firms to 
form R&D-cartels is only socially beneficial if technological spillovers are of 
considerable size relative to the extent that products are differentiated (i.e. 
P>0/2 for Cournot competition and p>0/(2 - 0 2) for Bertrand competition). 
Finally, under second stage Betrand competition social welfare of the full 
competitive game always exceeds that of the monopoly, while under Cournot 
behaviour this depends on whether or not technological spillovers exceed the 
degree of product differentiation. 23





























































































Comparing now the profits of a single firm for the respective games 
reveals that24
nf < %  < V p e [ 0 , I ) u ( ®  1],
2 2 (22)
* ? < < < * ? „  V|3e [ 0 , _ i L ) u ( J L , l ] ,
which indicates that irrespective o f the degree of product differentiation, the size 
of technological spillovers and the type of competition firms always want to 
collude in as many stages as allowed to. The threat that firms will extend the 
R&D-collusive agreement to the production stage is apparent.
Finally, we analyze RJV-cartels. If firms are allowed to cooperate in R&D 
it is always socially beneficial to allow them to fully exchange their innovative 
information.25 That is, both in case of Cournot and Bertrand competition 
existing R&D-cartels should be allowed to extend their agreement to a RJV- 
cartel. And firms are willing to do so since 3 it),/dp and are positive
V 0e[O .l ] .  Moreover, according to (20) and (21) allowing for RJV-cartels is 
also social welfare enhancing compared to the fully competitive regime (either 
in case of R&D-competition or RJVs).
To conclude, based on a comparison of social welfare, firms should only 
be allowed to cooperate in R&D when spillovers are substantial relative to the 
degree of product differentiation (that is, P>0/2 in case of Cournot competition 
and P> 0 / (2 -02) when firms compete in prices), and this collusive agreement 
should be that of a RJV-cartel (in which case spillovers are maximal). 
Implementation of this policy will not be frustrated by producers since it is also 
in their interest to collude in R&D and to fully exchange innovative information. 
However, this policy will evoke the danger of increased monopoly power since 
firms are tempted to extend the collusive agreement to the production stage. 
Compared to the fully non-cooperative game this will lead to a social welfare 
loss, both in case of Cournot and Bertrand competition if products are not 
differentiated to a high degree (i.e. 0>O.2). Let us consider therefore another 
R&D-stimulating policy: that of subsidizing private R&D.
24 When [5=0/2 we have for the Cournot case rt, = ku < nnr while forP = 9 /(2 -0 2) 
this ranking reads in case of Bertrand competition nt -  ku < nlir




























































































5. R&D-SUBSIDIES: COURNOT AND BERTRAND
Following Spencer and Brander (1983) we introduce a R&D-subsidy, s, per unit 
of R&D. It is assumed that, in order to finance the total R&D-subsidy, firms are 
taxed for it in the output stage. In other words, we consider a balanced-budget 
policy.26 By providing a R&D-subsidy, the government changes the cost 
structure of the R&D stage, and thus changes the set of actions (output or prices 
and R&D expenditures) which are compatible with the two-stage Nash-Coumot 
equilibrium.27 However, the taxation in the output stage does not affect the 
product market equilibrium in that the appropriate lump-sum tax is deducted 
from firms’ profits after the Nash-Coumot equilibrium is computed. Differences 
in equilibrium profits and welfare with respect to Section 3 reflect only the 
influence of the subsidy.
Given the demand, production and cost structures outlined in Section 2, 
profits of a single firms with R&D-subsidies (and before imposing the lump-sum 
tax) are given by
ni ( #,■ > <7; <Pi ’Pj’xi’xj , s ) = p,q ,-(A  -x t -x.)q t - y - L  +sxr (23)
for i,j= 1,2, i* j. Of course, social welfare is still given by (5). Observe that 
the R&D-subsidies directly affect the R&D investment, but not the way in which 
R&D investment is related to output or price. That is, the analyses of second 
stage behaviour remain unchanged with respect to those presented in Section 3. 
In what follows we will therefore only explicitly consider the R&D setting stage 
and the derivations of optimal R&D subsidies.
5.1 SUBSIDIZING COMPETITIVE R&D
Cournot and Bertrand profits, conditional on the optimal R&D subsidies, are 
given by (see also (8))
26 One of the disadvantages of subsidizing R&D is the distortionary effect of taxes which 
are needed to raise the necessary revenue. We abstract partially from this effect by assuming 
that firms pay a Pigou-tax.
27 Note that firms cannot establish this alteration in cost structure themselves, since, by 
definition of a Nash-Coumot equilibrium, it is not in their interest to shift financial resources 




























































































7if(x,x; ;5) 1 [ ( a - A ) ( 2 - 0 ) +( 2 - 0 ( i ) x +(2 |3 -e )^ ]2 
fo(4-02)2 2
2




7tf(x,,x ;s) ( 1 - 0 )
&(1+ 0)(2 -0 )
( 2 - 0 P - 0 2) * + ( 2 p - 0 - 0 2p)*.
x [ ( a - A ) - -
( 1 -0)(2 +0)
(24b)
- 7_ +, x ,
respectively, for i,j = l ,2,  i* j. The associated R&D-reaction functions are21
x c , C) = 2 ( a - A ) ( 2 - 0 ) ( 2 - 0 p ) + ( 4 - 0 2)2fr5 
X‘ Xj Z>y( 4 - 0 2)2 -2(2 -0(3)2
(25a)
,  2 ( 2 - 0 p ) ( 2 p - 0 )  v c
foy(4-02)2- 2 ( 2 - 0 P ) 2 J ’
x b B) = 2(a -A)( 1 -0 ) (2 + 0 ) (2 -0 P ~ 0 2)-*•(! -02) (4 - 0 2)2£>s 
X> by ( l  - 02)(4 - 02)2 - 2 ( 2 - 0P~02)2
2 ( 2 - 0 p - 0 2) ( 2 p - 0 - 0 2P) v8 (25b)
by( 1 -02)(4 -  02)2 - 2 ( 2 - 0 p - 0 2)2 ' ’
Stability conditions are still given by (9). From (25) equilibrium R&D 
investments are now readily derived 28





























































































x c(s) = 2 (a -A ) (2 -9 f t )+ (2+ 9) (4 -92)fr5 
' (vy(2+9)(4-92) - 2 ( 2 - 9 p ) ( l + p ) ’
_ 2 ( a - A ) ( 2 - 9 p - 9 2) + ( 2 - 9 ) ( l + 9 ) ( 4 - 9 2)fcs (26b)
' by( l  + 9 ) ( 2 - 9 ) ( 4 -9 2) - 2 ( 2 - 9 p - 9 2) ( l + P ) '
Observe that social welfare equals
W c(s) = -H l^ l_ [ (< 3 -A )+ (1 +P)^c(^)]2- 7x c(s)2, (27a)
fo(2 +9)2
W 8(*) = ------------------- [ ( a - A ) +( l +p ) x B(5)]2- y ^ fl( j )2. (27b)
b(2 -9 )2( 1 +9)
Maximizing (27) with respect to s results in the optimal R&D subsidies for the 
fully competitive games29
5 c = y ( a - A ) [ (3 + 9 ) (2 - 9 ) ( l + P ) - 2 (2 - 9 P ) ]
(2-9 ) [by(2+9)2-(3 +9)( 1+P)2] ’ (28a)
5 b = Y(Q-A)[(2 + 9 ) ( 3 - 2 9 ) ( l +P ) - 2 ( 2 - 9 p - 9 2)] (28b)
(2 + 9)[6y(2 -9 )2( l + 9 ) - ( 3 - 2 9 ) ( l + P ) 2]
When R&D-subsidies are provided technological spillovers affect R&D- 
investments in two opposite ways; one direct and one indirect. On the one hand 
R&D investments will fall if spillovers increase, due to diminishing appropria­
bility and possible strengthening of competitors. On the other hand, from (28) 
it is readily derived that R&D-subsidies are increasing in spillovers.30 That is, 
the incentive reducing effect of increasing technological spillovers on R&D- 
investment is parried by an increasing subsidy. The net effect of these two 
forces is positive31 implying that optimal R&D-subsidies more than offset the 
dis-incentives to invest in R&D due to increasing technological spillovers. If
29 Under Cournot competition the second order condition is thatèy(2 +0)2>(3 +0)( 1 +(S)2 
, while under Bertrand competition we impose that by(2 -0 )2( 1 +0)>(1 +(S)2( 3 -2 0 ).
30 See footnote 19.




























































































technological spillovers are completely internalized by allowing firms to form 
a RJV, wasteful duplication is eliminated and research is at maximum 
effectiveness (with respect to technological spillovers). In that case, therefore, 
R&D-subsidies are at their maximum.
5.2 SUBSIDIZING R&D-CARTELS.
Second stage joint profits are now given by 
1n c(x.,x.) =
b( 4 - 9 2)2
x E { [ (a -A ) (2 -0 )+ (2 -0 P )x .  + (2 3 - 0 )x.]2 (29a)
-y—  +5X.1, 
r 2
n s(x.,x) ( 1- 0 )
b( l  +0)(2-0)
1  (2 - 0P - 02)x +(2p - 0 - 02p)x
x E I  « - A  t --------------------:------------------------ 1
,-i (1 -0)(2 +0)
x,
-y—  +sx i. 
* 2
(29b)
Symmetric equilibrium levels of R&D, which follow from maximizing (29) over 
x., i = l ,2 ,  i#j,  conditional on the R&D-subsidy, are given by32
c. , _ 2 (a -A ) ( l  + P)+(2+0)2fcs 
" 6y(2+0)2- 2 ( l  +P)2 ’
x b(s) = 2(a - A)( 1 - 0)(1 + P)+(1 + 0 ) (2 - 0 ) 2£>5 
by(l  +0)(2 -0 )2- 2 ( l  -0)(1 +p)2
(30a)
(30b)




























































































Social welfare as a function of R&D, conditional on the R&D-subsidy, is 
still given by (27), where the respective R&D investments are given by (30). 
Maximizing these expressions for social welfare with respect to s leads to33
= y ( a - A ) ( l+ p ) ( l + 9 )
£>y(2 + 0)2- ( l  +P)2(3+0) ’ (31a)
s b = ________y(a -A ) ( l  +ft)________ (31b)
by(l  +0)(2 -0)2- ( l  +P)2(3 -20)
Also when firms are allowed to cooperate in R&D the optimal R&D- 
subsidies are increasing in the spillover-rate, and are at their maximum when 
information is fully shared. Since subsidized cooperative R&D is also increasing 
in the rate of technological spillovers34, exchanging innovative information has 
in this case a double stimulating effect on R&D investments: directly because 
of increased synergy (recall Section 3.2), and indirectly through the R&D- 
subsidy. Further, comparing the R&D-subsidies of the fully non-cooperative 
regime with those of the partial collusive game reveals that under Cournot 
competition the latter exceeds the former if P>0/2, while under Bertrand this 
holds for P> 0 / (2 -02). Recalling from Section 3.2 that non-cooperative R&D 
exceeds cooperative R&D whenever the spillover-rate is below 0/2 for Cournot 
competition, and below 0 / ( 2 -02) for Bertrand competition, (whereas the 
opposite holds for larger spillovers) we see that the optimal R&D-subsidies 
bring the levels of cooperative and non-cooperative R&D together. In fact, they 
will ensure that both investments are exactly the same, whether firms compete 
in price or quantity. The implications of this convergence will be explored in 
more detail in Section 6.
33 Second order conditions under Cournot and Bertrand competition are respectively 
(3 + 0 )(l +P)2<6y(2+ 9)2 and ( 3 -2 0 )( 1 +P)2<fcy(2-0)2(1 +0).





























































































Monopoly profits with R&D-subsidies equal
2 x f
n(<7, = Y.{piq - ( A - x j- ( \  +3)x. )^.-Y-1+î x }, i* j.
i = 1 ^
(32)
Maximizing (32) with respect to quantities yields (13) while (14) is the 
equilibrium price under Bertrand competition (in both cases, R&D investments 
are of course a function of s). Both under Cournot and Bertrand competition, 
first stage monopoly profits equal
n (x )  = ------!----- [ (a -A )+( l+p )x ]2-yx2+sx. (33)
2 * (  1 +0)
R&D-investments which maximize (33) conditional on s equal35 
2 b f t  1 • 0 | - ( 1  -Pi1






with x(s)  given by (34). The optimal R&D-subsidy which maximizes (35) turns 
out to be36
„c _ _ y (a - A ) ( l+ p )■3/7/ — >3 III — -------------------------------- .
4*y(l + 9 ) -3 ( l  +p)2
(36)
Even when firms are completely integrated there is an incentive for a govern­
ment to subsidize R&D for which the monopolist is taxed when producing with 
the new process. Although a monopolist is more able to appreciate the returns 
of its R&D-investment due to increased market power, there is still room for 
additional stimulation of research.
35 The second order is that stated in Section 3.3.





























































































Should a government provide R&D-subsidies, should it allow individual firms 
to cooperate in R&D, should it encourage firms to fully exchange information, 
or should it implement a combination of these options? With the analysis of the 
previous section we are able to shed some light on these issues. In what follows 
we first examine whether or not providing R&D-subsidies for which firms are 
taxed in the output stage is a socially desirable policy. Proposition 1 shows that 
it is. We then proceed by analyzing the first main theme of the paper; 
comparing the R&D-stimulating effect of providing direct R&D-subsidies with 
that of allowing firms to cooperate in R&D. It appears that in general the former 
policy is more effective than the latter in promoting private R&D. This 
statement is formalized in the second Proposition. We then analyze what 
combination of R&D-stimulating instruments will lead to the highest level of 
private R&D. Finally we arrive at the second main issue of the paper; according 
to social welfare, what is the optimal ’policy mix’? For a number of reasons, 
which will be explained below, we conclude that a government should subsidize 
RJVs. That is, firms should not be allowed to form R&D-cartels or RJV- 
cartels.37
Consideration of the sign and effects of optimal R&D subsidies for which 
firms are taxed in the output stage leads to the following proposition, the proof 
of which is given in Appendix 1.
PROPOSITION 1
For all three games considered, both under second stage Cournot and Bertrand 
competition, and irrespective of the size of technological spillovers and the 
extent to which products are differentiated, (i) the optimal R&D-subsidy is 
positive and (ii) subsidizing R&D optimally increases the level of R&D, output 
and social welfare, but lowers prices and net profits.
37 It should be noted, however, that the model employed here is highly stylized. The 
policy recommendations stated in this section should therefore be considered as tentative. 
Research based on more general models should give more definitive answers as to whether 




























































































Providing optimal R&D-subsidies for which firms are taxed in the output stage 
increases consumers’ surplus but lowers producers’ surplus. According to 
Proposition 1 the former effect dominates the latter with the net result that social 
welfare increases.38 Obviously consumers’ surplus is well served by lower 
prices and higher output. Profits on the other hand are affected in three ways; 
total revenue (p.#.) and marginal cost (A -x .-p* .) drop while expenditures on 
R&D (yx?/2)  increase.39 The efficiency gain is not enough to cover the loss 
in total revenue and the additional cost of R&D-investment, with the net result 
that profits fall.40 It could be argued therefore that firms are not interested in 
R&D-subsidies since it lowers their net profits. But if a government wants to 
increase social welfare it can always tax firms and set R&D-subsidies 
accordingly. Given the nature of a Nash equilibrium, firms’ best responses are 
then given by the equilibria as computed in the previous section.
On the other hand, R&D-subsidies must be provided with care, because 
excessive R&D investments (due to excessive R&D-subsidies) could be socially 
undesirable.41 In practise this means that adequate estimates are required of the 
parameters determining the optimal R&D-subsidy. In the model employed here 
the social welfare function is quadratic in s. Therefore, R&D-subsidies
38 Spencer and Brander (1983) report similar results. Their findings are more robust in 
that they consider a more general model than the one employed here. Also, we assume that 
both firms receive the same subsidy while Spencer and Brander (1983) examine the case in 
which either only one firms’ R&D is subsidized or both firms independently receive a R&D- 
subsidy (each from their own government). On the other hand we explicitly treat consumers’ 
surplus as a component of social welfare, allow products to be differentiated and explicitly 
consider technological spillovers whereas Spencer and Brander (1983) only investigate 
changes in producers’ surplus due to government intervention in markets for homogeneous 
products where technological spillovers are absent.
39 The fact that total revenue drops is not immediate from Proposition 1 since prices fall 
but production increase. That nevertheless their products drop is straightforward to calculate 
from Tables 1 to 4 and therefore left as an exercise for the reader.
40 This observation however neglects the revenues in time of successful R&D. Because 
we consider only a static model, in each period firms have to invest in R&D. But if firms can 
use the innovated process for several periods, they can invest less in R&D in periods after 
the first. In these subsequent periods the efficiency gain accomplished in the first period may 
well outweigh the loss in total revenue and the increased first period R&D-investment. These 
issues should however be considered more thoroughly in a dynamic setting, a task we will 
not pursue in this paper.




























































































exceeding two times their optimal value are socially harmful. This means that, 
for instance, over estimating the spillover effect can lead to excessive R&D 
promotion, since all optimal subsidies are increasing in P .
Having established the desirability of providing R&D-subsidies we can 
now compare its effect on R&D-investment with that of allowing firms to form 
RJVs, R&D-cartels or RJV-cartels. The next proposition summarizes this 
comparison.
PROPOSITION 2
To promote private R&D, both under second stage Cournot and Bertrand 
competition, subsidizing non-collusive R&D optimally is more effective than (i) 




Comparing the equilibrium levels of non-cooperative, subsidized R&D (xfj  andx;f 
under Cournot and Bertrand competition respectively), with the non-subsidized 
R&D investment in the R&D-cartel (xtf  and x,f) reveals that
c _ by(2 + Q)2( 1 +6) t
"  " 2[6y(2+ 0)2- ( 3 +0)( 1 +P)2] ’
x b _ x s[1+___________ by( 1 +0)(2 -0 )2___________ }
"  " 2(1 -0)[foy(l + 0 ) (2 -0 )2- ( l + p ) 2(3-20) ]  '
Appropriate second order conditions ensure that the expressions in brackets 
exceed 1.
Part (ii)




























































































dx's = (Q —A)(3 + 8)[fry(2+8)2 + (3 + 6)(1 + P)2] > Q 
[fcy(2+0)2- ( 3 + 0 ) ( l  +P)2]2
d x <Bs = (a  ~ A )(3  -28)[£> y( l + 8 ) ( 2 - 9 ) 2+ ( l + P ) 2( 3 - 2 9 ) ]  > Q 
a p  [fcy (l + 0 ) ( 2 - 0 ) 2 - ( l + P ) 2( 3 - 2 0 ) ] 2
Then, realizing that
c, c, ,  {a-A)[by{\  +8)(2+8)2-2(3+8)]  ^ n 
h 15=0 ' p"  [fcy(2 +0)2-(3 +0)] [by(2 +0)2 -4]
_v fl| _ (a-A)
"  lp’° '  " by(\  +8)(2 -0 )2- (3 - 2 0 )
x by( 1 -|-8 )(2 -9 )2- 2 ( l  - Q)(3 - 20) > Q 
by(l  +0)(2 -0 )2- 4 ( l  -0)
completes the proof, since */C|p„, and x,B |pM| are the non-subsidized equilib­
rium investments in a RJV under second stage Cournot and Bertrand competi­
tion respectively.
In the model used here, forming a RJV does not increase R&D investment 
because of diminishing appropriability of research efforts when spillovers 
increase.42 Moreover, since the R&D-stimulating effect of an optimal R&D- 
subsidy is stronger than the non-appropriability incentive (see Section 5.1), it is 
readily derived that subsidizing non-collusive R&D is more effective than 
allowing firms to form RJVs.
More important, however, is that providing R&D-subsidies is more 
effective than allowing firms to form a R&D-cartel.43 Possible synergetic
42 Observe that dx,c/3p  ,3 ;t/ /3 p < 0 .
43 In general this is not true for a RJV-cartel. Comparing subsidized non-cooperative R&D 
with R&D investments of a RJV-cartel under second stage Cournot competition reveals that 
the former exceeds the latter whenever £y(2+0)2[ |3 (3 + 9 )-( l -9 )]> 4(1  -p 2)(3+0). 




























































































effects coming from R&D-collusive agreements can be mimicked (more) 
effectively through R&D-subsidies. This observation is important when deciding 
what R&D-stimulating policy to implement. In particular it is doubtful whether 
stimulating private R&D at the cost of giving firms additional market power is 
the appropriate policy to follow, knowing that a more effective instrument is at 
hand which also preserves the control over market power with the authorities.
We proceed with examining what combination of R&D-enhancing 
instruments will lead to the highest level of private R&D. In order to address 
this issue, all subsidy-games have to be solved completely, the results of which 
are summarized in Tables 3 and 4. An immediate result of this exercise is stated 
in the next proposition.
PROPOSITION 3
Both under second stage Cournot and Bertrand competition subsidizing non- 
cooperative R&D or subsidizing a R&D-cartel leads to the same market 
outcome and social welfare.
Proposition 3 states that encouraging R&D investments by allowing firms to 
participate in R&D-cartels and in addition subsidizing this agreement according­
ly, has the same effect on market performances and social welfare as subsidizing 
non-cooperative R&D. Since Proposition 3 holds for all values of p, it is in 
particular valid for 3 = 1, i.e. both under second stage Cournot and Bertrand 
competition optimally subsidising a RJV leads to the same market outcome and 
social welfare as optimally subsidizing a RJV-cartel. According to Proposition 
3, in terms of market outcomes and social welfare, there is no need for relaxing 
antitrust laws which in effect indicates that R&D-cooperation is redundant.
In Section 3 we concluded that in most cases the full cooperative regime 
leads to the highest level of R&D. With R&D-subsidies available the opposite 
holds. Both under Cournot and Bertrand competition a subsidized monopoly will 
always invest less in R&D compared to either the competitive or partial 
collusive regimes,44 The ability to appropriate more the returns to R&D when
Bertrand competition subsidized competitive R&D-investment exceeds that of a RJV-cartel 
if by( l+ 0 ) (2 -0 )2[P (3 -2 0 ) - ( l - 2 0 ) ]> 4 ( l- fS 2) ( 3 - 2 0 ) ( l - 0 ) .  Given the second order 
condition b y > 2 (2 -0 P -9 2)2/( l  -0 2)(4 -0 2)2 this holds V9 s  [0,1) if P>0.86.




























































































Table 3 Equilibrium Outcomes of the Subsidized Cournot Games
No Cooperation in R&D Cooperation in R&D Cooperation in R&D





*7(2 +0)2-(3 +8)( 1 +P)2
i>7(2+8)2-(l*P)2(3+8) 4i>7(l+0)-3(l+P)2
(a-A)(l+P)(3+8) 3(o-A)(l+P)
*7(2+8)2-(3+8)( 1 +P)2 4*7(1 +6) -3(1 +P)2
c r,_ by(a -A)(2 +8)0 +8) (a -A)[2*7( I+8)-3(l+P)2]
*7(2+0)2-(3 +8)0 +p)2 4*7(1 +8)-3(1 +P)2
Q,c 27(a -A)(2 +8) 4y(a - A)*7(2+8)2-(3 +0)(1 +P)2 4*7(1 +0)-3(l+P)2
nc 7(a-A)2[2*7(2+8)2-( 1 +P)2(3+8)2] 7(a-A)2[8*7(l+8)-9(l+P)2]2[by(2 -8)2 -(3 +8)0 +P)2]2 2[4*7( l+0)-3(l+P)2]2
w,c 7(a-A)2(3+8) 3 y(a-A)2by(2 +8)!-(3 -*-8)( 1 +P)2 4*7(1+8)-3(l+p)2
competition is diminished in the product market is more than offset by providing 
R&D subsidies. Projects in which firms are allowed to jointly explore the 
benefits of their collusive R&D in order to enhance R&D-investments (but at 
the cost of giving them more market power) are difficult to defend when the 
provision of R&D-subsidies is a viable alternative.
That R&D-subsidies strongly counter the inability of firms to appropriate 
the returns to their R&D-investments when confronted with competition in the 
product market can also be seen in another way. It is well known that Cournot 
markets are associated with less competition than Bertrand markets.45 Indeed,




























































































Table 4 Equilibrium Outcomes of the Subsidized Bertrand Games”
No Cooperation in R&D 
No Cooperation in Production
Cooperation in R&D 
No Cooperation in Production
S B
V (a -A ) [ (2 + 0 ) ( 3 -2 0 ) ( l+ P ) -2 8 1] y ( a -A ) ( l+ P )
(2 + 0)[&y( 2 - 0 ) 2(1 + 0 ) - (3 - 2 0 ) (1 + P ) 2] by( l  + 0 ) (2 -0 )2- ( l + P ) 2(3 -2 0 )
( a -A ) ( l+ P ) ( 3 -2 8 )  
by{ 1 +0 )( 2 —0 )2 —C1 + P)2(3 -  20 )
by(a-A) (  1 + 0 )(2 -9 )  
by(2 -  8)2( l + 0 ) - ( 3 - 2 0 ) ( l + P ) 2
2y(a -A)(2 -9 )
&Y(2-6)2( 1 + 9 ) - ( 3 - 2 0 ) ( l  +P)2
y ( a-A  )*[2by( 1 - 9 2) (2 - 0 ) 2- ( l  +P)2( 3 -2 0 ) 2] 
2[fry(2-0)2( l +0 ) - ( 3 - 2 0 ) ( l + P ) 2]2
■y(a-A)2(3 -2 9 )
by(2 - 0 )2( 1 +0) - (3  -20)(1  +(3)2
3 See for the full cooperative regime Table 3.
the R&D-levels under Cournot competition exceed those under Bertrand 
competition in absence of a R&D-subsidy, both in case of competitive and 
cooperative R&D.46 This of course is precisely due to the ability of firms to 
appreciate more the returns to research when confronted with Cournot 
competition than under Bertrand behaviour. With R&D-subsidies provided 
however, the reverse holds. Although firms face more competition under 
Bertrand than under Cournot, they invest more in R&D in case they set prices 
in the output stage when R&D is subsidized.47 The reason for this reversal is
46 See appendix 2.




























































































twofold. First, the R&D-subsidies under Bertrand exceed those under Cournot, 
and second, the effect on R&D-investment of the subsidy is less under Cournot 
than under Bertrand competition.48
We close this discussion with the second main theme of the paper: 
establishing the optimal R&D-stimulating policy. As in Section 4 we contrast 
private and social incentives. Beginning with the former observe that
c C C
* / s ~  fy ls < Tims
B B B
* Is ~  Tills < Tims
V 0e [0,1), 0e [O , l ] ,
Firms’ objectives are clear; both under second stage Cournot and Bertrand com­
petition they want to collude in as many stages as allowed to in order to make 
as much profits as possible. The following comparisons show that for both kinds 
of second stage competition this pursuit for additional market power is not 
without cost
K  = < s  < w L
V9e[0 .1 ) ,  0e [O , l ] ,
W B = W B < W Bvvls v rIls n  Ills'
Indeed, a subsidized monopoly is both under Cournot and Bertrand competition 
undesirable, which confirms the obvious consequence of Proposition 3; firms 
should not be allowed to form (subsidized) R&D-cartels or (subsidized) RJV- 
cartels. Instead, the authorities should provide optimal R&D-subsidies in markets 
where research is independently undertaken.
Finally it should be noted that both W,s and W,f are increasing in the 
spillover rate.49 This means that the optimal policy for authorities to follow is 
to encourage firms to form RJVs (i.e. full exchange of technological information 
after independent R&D) and to subsidize this agreement accordingly. This policy 
not only leads to the highest level of private R&D investment50 and social
48 See footnote 19.
49 3W;jc/3(5 and 3W,f/3P are positive V p e [0 ,l ] .




























































































welfare, but also preserves the control over market power by the authorities.51 
7. CONCLUSIONS
Comparing the effect on private R&D investments of allowing firms to collude 
in R&D with that of providing optimal R&D-subsidies (for which firms are 
taxed in the product market) reveals that both under Cournot and Bertrand 
competition in general the latter policy is more effective than the former in 
promoting R&D activity. Analyzing the implementation of both policies 
simultaneously reveals that if firms compete in either price or quantity (i) 
allowing firms to collude in R&D is redundant if the provision of R&D- 
subsidies is feasible and (ii) firms should only be encouraged to share their 
(independent) research outcomes (i.e. to form RJVs) and this agreement should 
be subsidized accordingly.52
Subsidizing RJVs has the obvious advantage of not having to abandon 
antitrust legislation concerning private R&D. Further, the dissemination of 
innovations is complete implying that duplication of research is absent. 
Moreover, lowering the (marginal) cost of R&D lowers entry barriers which in 
turn will trigger competition both in the R&D stage and the product market.
The analysis presented here is a first step in assessing the impact of 
simultaneously subsidizing private R&D activity and allowing firms to collude 
in R&D. It should be noted that the whole exercise is based on the synthesis of 
two stylized models in which many aspects of demand and supply structures in 
general and of the process of R&D in particular are neglected. The policy 
implications are therefore tentative and a more general analysis of the same 
issue should lead to more robust conclusions.
51 To the extent that firms are able to share information concerning product market 
(pricing) behaviour when exchanging technological knowledge, some control over market 
power is given up by allowing firms to join RJVs. This threat, however, is much more 
apparent (and the actions of firms much more effective) when producers are allowed to 
coordinate their R&D-investment so as to maximize overall profits (i.e. to form R&D-cartels). 
See also Martin (1994b).
52 One way of implementing this policy is to confront firms with a Pigou-tax and to give 
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APPENDIX I PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
part (i)
The second order conditions associated with deriving the optimal R&D-subsidies 
guarantee that the denominators of the respective subsidies are positive. By 
restrictions on the parameters of the model (a,A,b,y> 0, a>A , 0 e [O , l )  and 
3 e [0,1 ]) the same is true for the respective numerators.
part (ii)
R&D
Comparing subsidized and non-subsidized R&D under Cournot and Bertrand 
competition leads to
by(a-A)(2+Q)3 
[&y(2 +0)2 -  (3 + 0)(  1 +P)2]
x _________ (3 - 0 ) P  +( 1 -0 )_________
[ b y ( 2 + 0 ) ( 4 - 0 2) - 2 ( 2 - 0 3 ) ( l  + 3)1
by (a-A) (  \ + P ) ( l+0)(2+0)2 
[&y(2 + 0)2 - ( 3 + 0 ) ( l + p ) 2] O y ( 2 + 0 ) 2 -
by{a-A){ \  + 0 ) ( 2 - 0)3
[by(l + 0 ) (2 - 0 ) 2- ( l  +3)2(3-20) ]
x [ 1 +(3 +20)3] > 0,
[i>y( 1 + 0 ) ( 2 - 0 ) ( 4 - 0 2) - 2 ( l  + 3 ) ( 2 - 0 3 _02)]
B *y(f l -A)( l+3)
[^y(2-0)2(l  + 0 ) - ( l  + 3)2(3 —20)]
X
(1 +0 ) ( 2 - 0 ):
2 * y ( a - A ) ( l+ 3 ) ( l+ 0 ) > 0,
[4i>y( 1 + 0 ) -3 ( l  +3)2][2èy( l  + 0 ) - ( l  +3)2]





























































































Comparing total output for the subsidized and non-subsidized games under
Cournot and Bertrand competition leads to
2y(n -A )( l+ p)
[by(2 +0)2-(3 + 0)( 1 +P)2]
x ( 2 +9)2[ ( l - e ) + P ( 3 - 6 ) ]  > Q
[by(2+0) (4-02) - 2 ( 2 - 0 3 ) ( l  + 3)] "
________ 2y(a-A)( l  -|-3)2(1 +9)(2+9)________  > Q
[by(2 + 0)2- (3+ 0 ) ( l  +P)2][fcy(2 + 0 )2- 2 (1+3)2] '
2 y ( n - A ) ( l +3 ) (2 - 9 ) 2 
[i>y(2-0)2(l  + 0 ) - ( 3 - 2 0 ) ( l  +3)2]
x ______________ [ 1 +3(3 +29)]_____________  > Q




2 y (a -A ) ( l+ p )2
[£>y(2 - 0)2( l + 0 ) - ( 3 - 2 0 ) ( l + 3 ) 2]
x ____________ (2 -9 )____________
[£>y(l + 0 ) (2 - 0 ) 2- 2(1+3 )2 (1 -9 ) ]
> 0,
Qms- Qn, = Q m -Q n, =
2y(a -A)( 1 +3)2
[4&y( 1 +0) -  3( 1 +3)2] [22>y( 1 + 0) - ( 1 +3)2
> 0,





























































































c_ c = _ by{a-A){  2+9)2( l+9)
P,s P‘ ~ [fey(2+0)(4-02) - 2 ( 2 - 0 3 ) ( l  + P)]
x [ Q - 9 ) +2 ( 2 - 0 ) P +( 3 -0 ) p 2] < Q 
[£>7(2+0)2- (3+ 0 ) ( l  +(3)2]
D c „ c __  by(a -A) ( l+P)2( l+ 0 ) 2(2+0)
r n. L?II ---------------------------------------------------------------------------  ^  »
[by (2 + 0)2- 2 ( l + P ) 2] [by {2 +0)2- (3 + 0 ) ( l+ P )2]
Comparing prices for the subsidized and non-subsidized games under Cournot





[by{\  + 0 ) ( 2 - 0 ) ( 4 - 0 2) - 2 ( l + P ) ( 2 - 0 p - 0 2)]
x (1 + P ) (2 -0 )2(1 + 0)[1 + P(20+3] < Q 
[&7(2 -0 )2( 1 + 0 ) - ( 3 - 2 0 ) ( l + P ) 2]
by(a-A)
[£>7(1 +0)(2-0)2-2(  1 + P)2(1 -0)]
x (1 + P)2(2~0)(1 +0) < Q
[i>7(2 — 0)2( 1 + 0 ) - ( 3 - 2 0 ) ( l  +P)2]
Puis Pm ~ p M s B pm
m ___________ f e 7 ( q - A ) ( i ^ ) 2( i ^ 0 ) _________ < 0
[4b7(l + 0 ) -3 ( l  +p)2][2Z?7(l + 0 ) - ( l  +P)2]





























































































Comparing profits for the subsidized and non-subsidized games under Cournot 
and Bertrand competition can only be done analytically for the partial and full 
cooperation games, the results of which are
________V(a-A)2fey(l+P)2(2 + 9)2( l + e ) 2 < Q
2[by(2 + 0)2 -  (3 + 0)( 1 + (3)2]2[by(2 + 0)2- 2 (  1 +p)2]
y ( a - A ) 2by(  1 +P)2
2[&y(2-0)2( 1 + 0 ) - ( 3 - 2 0 ) ( l  +P)2]2
x _________ (2 - Q)2( 1+e)_________  < 0 ,
[èy( l  + 0 ) ( 2 - 0 ) 2- 2 ( l  + p)2( l  -  0)]
c B _  B 
K lll  ~  K Ills K lll
y ( a - A ) 2by( l  +(3)2(1 +0)
[4fry( 1 +0) -3 (  1 +3)2]2[2èy( 1 +0) -  ( 1 + P)2]
< 0.
These inequalities hold for V|3e [0,1] and V 0e[O , l ) .  For the two non- 
cooperative cases we have to rely on numerical simulations. These show that 
Jt/V - 7T/7< 0 and Jtfj- 7tf<0 for all values any parameter of the model can take, 





























































































Comparing social welfare for the subsidized and non-subsidized games under
Cournot and Bertrand competition leads to
y ( a - A) 2by(2 +0)4 
[&Y(2+0)2- (3 + 0 ) ( l  +P)2]
x [( 1 ~9) +P(3 ~0)]2
[fcY(2+0 ) ( 4 - 0 2) - 2 ( 2 - 0 p ) ( l +P)]2
y(a~A)2by(l  + P)2(2 + 0)2(1 + 0)2 > Q
[^Y(2+0)2-(3 + 0)(1 +P)2][^y(2+0)2-2(1 +P)2]2
y ( a - A) 2by{ \ +0)(2-0)2 
[f>y(2-0)2(l  + 0 ) - ( 3 - 2 0 ) ( l + P ) 2]
x [ ( 2 + 0 ) ( 3 - 2 0 ) ( l + P ) - 2 ( 2 - 0 p - 0 2)]2 > Q
[ fcY( l  + 0 ) ( 2 - 0 ) ( 4 -0 2) - 2 ( l  + P ) ( 2 - 0 p - 0 2)]2
W ‘ -W„B ___________ y ( a - A) 2___________
[èY(2-0)2( l +0 ) - ( 3 - 2 0 ) ( l +p)2]
X by(i  ~t~P)2(2 —0)2( l +0)
[by{ \ +0)(2 -0 )2- 2 ( l  +P)2(1 -0 ) ]2
> 0,
w '- w ,? ,  = w,B wIlls "  III
_ ________ Y(^-A)2fcY(l+e ) ( l +P)2________ > 0
[4&y(1 +0) -3(  1 +P)2] [2*y( 1 +0 ) - ( l  +P)2]2




























































































APPENDIX 2 SOME R&D-LEVELS COMPARED
X C-.X B = ___________2by(a-A)___________
[by(2 + 0 ) (4 - 0 2) - 2(2 — 0 p )( I +P)]
x _____________ (1 + P)03( 4 - 0 2)_____________ > 0
[by(\  + 0 ) (2 -0 ) (4  — 02) —2 ( 2 —0(3 — 02)(1 + P)]
x c _ x b = ________________ 4feY( « - A ) ( l +|3)03________________  > 0
[èy(2+ 0)2-2(  1 +3)2] [èy(2-0)2( 1 + 0 ) -2 (  1 +p)2( 1 -0)]
b y ( a - A )
[by(2+d)2 - ( 3 + 0 ) ( l + P ) 2]
(1 +P)02(02 + 20 -  4)
[feY( l + 0 ) ( 2 - 0 ) 2-( l+(3)2( 3 - 2 0 ) ]
< 0,
____________by {a ~ A ) ( l+ P ) 0 ( 4  + 0)___________  > 0
[^7(2 + 0)2 -  (3 +0)( 1 +3)2] [4fey( l + 0 ) - 3 ( l + p ) 2]
b _ b b y ( a - A )
rIs XIlls ~  ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[by( l + 0 ) ( 2 - 0 ) 2- ( 1 + 3  )2 ( 3 - 2 0 ) ]
x (1 + 3 ) 0  + 0 ) 0 ( 4 - 3 0 )  > Q 




























































































d x ,B( s )  d x , c ( s )
ap P
___________ fr(i+P)2___________
[fc7(2+0 ) ( 4 - 0 2) 2 ( 2 - e p ) ( l +p)]
x ________________ 93(4 - Q2>________________ > 0 ,
[ £>"y( 1 + 0 ) ( 2 - 0 ) ( 4 -9 2) - 2 ( 2 - 0 p - 0 2)( l  +P)2]
d x B(s) _ dx f (s )  _ 4fe(l+P)2
ap ap [by(\  +0)(2 -0)2- 2 ( l  -0)(1 +P)2]
x _________* ________  > 0 .
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